This study uses a confidential dataset of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on taxpayer behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Though the ability or incentives to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS targets firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a significant effect on taxpayers' initial filing liability (a deterrence effect), total filing liability (combined effect of deterrence and enforcement), or tax reserves (expected future tax payments associated with positions claimed in the current year). Results suggest that audit certainty alters managers' expectations regarding future tax payments but does not have significant deterrence or enforcement effects. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of expensive certain audit programs. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided confidential tax information to Towery pursuant to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that allow disclosure of information to a contractor to the extent necessary to perform a research contract for the IRS. None of the confidential tax information received from the IRS will be disclosed in this treatise. Statistical aggregates will be used so that a specific taxpayer cannot be identified from information supplied by the IRS. All opinions are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the IRS.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the effect of tax audit certainty on corporate taxpayer behavior. 1 Understanding how audit certainty affects corporate taxpayers is important because many of the largest firms in the U.S. are assigned the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program, where the risk of audit examination is 100 percent. We estimate that firms assigned to the CIC program account for between 65 and 70% of the U.S. market cap in 2011.
Further, the IRS invests a sizeable portion of its resources in these efforts. The mean (median) CIC audit used approximately 2,500 (1,700) IRS-personnel-hours during our sample period. We also estimate that less than half of tax returns filed in the year preceding CIC assignment are audited. 2 Thus, the IRS commitment to a program of audit certainty is both an economically substantial resource allocation decision for the U.S. government and a nontrivial increase in audit probability for the CIC firms. Studying the effect of audit certainty on taxpayer behavior has been difficult because corporate taxpayers are not required to publicly disclose whether they face certain audit. We overcome this data limitation using confidential corporate tax return data and a confidential dataset of corporate taxpayers in the CIC program.
The effect of audit certainty on taxpayer behavior is not clear ex ante. Over the past several decades, both theoretical and empirical studies have documented that the risk of tax audit examination affects taxpayer behavior. These studies generally predict that taxpayers enter fewer uncertain tax positions to reduce their probability of audit when tax uncertainty increases the probability of audit selection. However, prior research has not specifically considered whether 1 We define tax audit certainty as a 100 percent likelihood that a tax return is subject to audit. 2 We use confidential IRS audit examination data to estimate hours per CIC audit and the audit rate before CIC assignment. Our audit rate before CIC assignment is overstated to the extent that the CIC team audits pre-CIC tax return years after taxpayers are assigned to the CIC program. See Footnote 9 for further detail.
this prediction applies to firms subject to audit certainty. 3 Indeed, because tax uncertainty does not affect the probability of tax audit examination for taxpayers facing audit certainty, these firms likely have different incentives to engage in uncertain tax avoidance. 4 On the one hand, taxpayers facing audit certainty could have less incentive to claim uncertain tax positions if the increased detection risk lowers the expected benefit of tax uncertainty such that a subset of tax positions are not value-creating. This would be consistent with the negative relation between audit selection risk and tax avoidance documented at lower points on the audit probability spectrum (Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman 2012) .
On the other hand, because taxpayers facing certain audit have no incentive to reduce their tax planning to avoid IRS audit selection, audit certainty could result in increased tax uncertainty. Consistent with this intuition, Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001) finds that high-income individual taxpayers reported lower taxable income amounts when told before filing their tax return that they will be audited with certainty. The authors conjecture that taxpayers claim additional tax benefits to create a more aggressive starting point for negotiations, with the goal of minimizing tax liability and under the assumption that the audit will not detect and punish all tax avoidance. In sum, how tax audit certainty affects taxpayer behavior is an empirical question.
Before testing our research question, we first analyze the determinants of assignment to the CIC program using selection factors outlined in the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), which 3 One exception is Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) , a study that examines determinants of IRS proposed audit adjustments. In a supplemental test, the authors find using a levels analysis that CIC firms and non-CIC firms have similar GAAP effective tax rates (computed using current tax expense from the financial statements). In contrast, our study uses both levels and changes analyses to investigate how CIC assignment impacts initial tax return filing positions, initial filing positions adjusted for future settlements, and tax reserves. The first two measures enable us to disentangle deterrence and enforcement effects, and the latter measure is a proxy for managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. 4 While the probability of audit is 100 percent for firms in the CIC program, the probability of audit for any particular transaction remains less than 100 percent. Thus, taxpayer behavior could continue to affect the audit risk of any particular transaction.
capture various size and complexity determinants. Though other research cites size and complexity as determinants of CIC assignment (Mills 1998; Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod 2007) , these statements are based on the IRM listed factors rather than on empirical tests. Our analysis tests these statements and serves two purposes: (i) to determine whether CIC program assignment is mechanical in nature based upon the IRM listed factors or whether factors associated with tax avoidance (beyond size and complexity) also significantly contribute to assignment, and (ii) to provide researchers without access to CIC assignment data a model of audit certainty.
We find that many of the IRM listed factors are positively associated with assignment into the CIC program, with gross receipts being the most significant size determinant and the number of geographic segments being the most significant complexity determinant. When we include factors known to affect firms' incentives or ability to avoid taxes (such as research and development expenses, excess stock option deductions, and net operating loss carryforwards) as potential determinants, we find that a number of the factors are significantly associated with CIC assignment. However, their inclusion does not dramatically improve the fit of the model. These results collectively suggest that although inclusion in the CIC program is associated with firms' incentives or ability to avoid taxes, the CIC assignment decision is primarily based on firm size and complexity and is largely mechanical.
Next, we study the effect of audit certainty on taxpayers' initial filing liabilities, total filing liabilities, and financial statement reserves for uncertain tax positions. The taxpayer's initial federal filing liability rate serves as our variable to test whether audit certainty has a deterrence effect on tax avoidance behavior. The advantage of the taxpayer's initial federal liability rate relative to tax avoidance measures used in prior literature is that it captures initial tax payments to the tax authority and is not confounded by financial reporting incentives. We measure the combined effect of deterrence and enforcement using: (i) the taxpayer's initial federal liability rate adjusted for settlements, and (ii) the cash effective tax rate (ETR). Financial statement reserves for uncertain tax positions claimed in the current year proxy for managers' expectations of future tax payments associated with current tax return positions.
We use both a levels approach and a changes approach to test our research question. We implement our levels analysis using a pooled sample from 2000 to 2011 of firms assigned to the CIC program and firms not assigned the CIC program. Using a variety of different scalars and fixed effects, we find no significant differences in initial federal filing liability rates, adjusted federal filing liability rates, or cash effective tax rates between firms assigned to the CIC program and firms not assigned to the program. We do, however, find that firms assigned to the CIC program report higher reserves for current year tax positions relative to non-CIC firms, suggesting that CIC firms expect higher future tax payments associated with current tax return positions than non-CIC firms.
To implement our changes analysis, we identify 405 corporate taxpayers that are first assigned to the CIC program between 2000 and 2011 ('newly-assigned firms'). We then construct two samples of propensity-matched control firms-(i) firms never assigned to the program between 2000 and 2011 ('non-assigned firms'), and (ii) firms assigned to the program both before and after newly-assigned firms enter the CIC program ('long-assigned firms'). The matched sample design allows us to not only compare the tax behavior of a firm to itself before and after the change in its CIC program status, but to also compare its tax behavior with the tax behavior of a firm that does not experience a change in CIC status.
We find that, post-assignment, the federal filing liability rates, the adjusted federal filing liability rates, and the cash effective tax rates of newly-assigned firms are not statistically different than those of the matched sample of non-assigned firms. Further, post-assignment, none of the tax payment rates of newly-assigned firms are statistically different than the tax payment rates of the matched sample of long-assigned firms. Thus, our results suggest that the CIC program does not have significantly higher deterrence and enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program.
Consistent with our levels analysis, we find that newly-assigned firms report higher financial statement reserves for current year tax positions relative to both non-assigned and longassigned firms, suggesting that audit certainty does impact financial reporting for income taxes.
Our result that the initial tax liability does not change for newly-assigned firms suggests that the increased reserves do not represent an increase in uncertain tax avoidance. More plausible explanations include: (i) firms systematically underestimated their likelihood of sustaining a position prior to CIC assignment and subsequently updated their expectations based on 'learning' in the audit process, and/or (ii) firms incorporated audit likelihood into their determination of reserves prior to CIC assignment (inconsistent with the U.S. GAAP requirement that firms assume audit certainty with respect to each uncertain tax position).
Our study expands the literature in multiple ways. First, our model of CIC determinants provides researchers with a better proxy for the audit risk of large, publicly-traded companies.
Prior studies measure CIC participation as firms with at least $250 million in assets (e.g. El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Pittman 2011; Hoopes et al. 2012) . We report that only 19.5 percent of firms with assets greater than $250M are assigned to the CIC program, suggesting that this 6 commonly-used proxy is quite weak in distinguishing large firms subject to certain audit. 5 Second, we provide evidence that CIC assignment is mechanical in nature and that factors associated with a firms' incentives or ability to avoid taxes are not currently a significant determinant of this substantial resource allocation decision. Third, to our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the deterrence and enforcement effects of audit certainty. In doing so, we further our understanding of the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority. We do not view our results in contrast with prior research that documents a negative relation, on average, between audit probability and tax avoidance (Mills and Sansing 2000; Hoopes et al. 2012 ). Our study focuses on the top end of the audit probability continuum, where reporting behavior cannot affect audit selection.
Our findings are also important to tax authorities. Understanding how audit risk affects taxpayer behavior informs the IRS as it designs and implements new audit approaches. Per a discussion between one of the authors and the IRS, CIC audits consume a substantial portion of IRS Large Business and International (LB&I) audit resources. Whether and how firms alter behavior within the CIC program informs the cost-benefit assessment of the program. Our results suggest that the CIC program does not have significantly higher deterrence and enforcement effects than the IRS's non-CIC audit process for large corporations. Although not anticipated ex ante, these results are consistent with the IRS's recent announcement to potentially modify the CIC program to incorporate an as-yet-unspecified risk-based approach that will likely leave many large corporate taxpayers uncertain of whether to expect an audit. 5 However, given that we find no significant difference in the initial tax liability, the adjusted tax liability, or the cash effective tax rates for CIC firms relative to non-CIC firms, we caution researchers to consider whether IRS audit risk is expected to have the same behavioral effect at the top end of the continuum as researchers have documented at lower points of the continuum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the CIC program and describes relevant literature. Section III details research design. Section IV presents results, Section V presents robustness checks and Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) Program
Many of the largest corporate taxpayers in the United States are subject to certain audit as The IRS team consists of the examination team manager, field agents, industry specialists, and subject matter experts. CIC audit teams generally provide more in-depth audits than traditional IRS audits. For example, subject matter experts in areas such as engineering, excise taxes, and employment are included in the list of specialists assigned to a CIC audit team.
Firms are assigned to, rather than invited into, the CIC Program. 7 Per the Internal Revenue Manual, this assignment is made based on a point system involving seven main criteria: (i) gross assets; (ii) gross receipts; (iii) operating entities; (iv) number of industries; (v) total foreign assets; (vi) related transactions; and (vii) foreign taxes paid (Internal Revenue Manual, 6 Anecdotally, the audit team generally spends enough time at the taxpayer's place of business to warrant an office within the taxpayer's place of business permanently designated for the team. 7 This contrasts with the IRS Compliance Assurance Program (CAP), where a corporate taxpayer voluntarily agrees to discuss uncertain tax issues with an IRS team prior to filing its annual tax return. See De Simone, Sansing, and Seidman (2013) and Beck and Lisowsky (2013) for evidence on the effect of voluntary audits on taxpayer behavior. 4.46.2.5). Each criterion has a point value, and a firm is assigned to the CIC program if its total point value is greater than or equal to 12. Firms with a point value of less than 12 can also be assigned to the CIC program if they are sufficiently complex to warrant certain audit.
Appendix A provides a timeline of CIC program assignment. When the IRS assigns a taxpayer into the CIC program, the taxpayer is informed of the assignment after filing its annual tax return. The taxpayer is considered to be in the CIC program for the year prior to notification, although the CIC team often audits tax returns for multiple years prior to CIC assignment. 
Related Literature
The strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority has been studied extensively in the accounting, economics, and finance literatures. Early models (e.g., , Allingham and Sandmo 1972) characterize taxpayer compliance as a function of tax rates, probability of detection and punishment, penalties, and taxpayer risk-aversion. 9, 10 Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986) extends these basic models to allow the IRS to condition its audit rules on the reports it receives from taxpayers. This 'strategic tax compliance model' provides different predictions than earlier models because a taxpayer must now consider how its report affects the 8 For example, a taxpayer may be notified in late 2006 after filing its 2005 tax return that it has been assigned to the CIC program. The taxpayer is coded as a CIC firm for 2005 because the audit of the 2005 tax return will be conducted by a CIC team. However, the CIC team sometimes also audits prior years in which the statute of limitations remains open. 9 Noncompliance can either be entering into fraudulent tax positions or entering into uncertain tax positions, where those with weaker facts are more likely to be overturned if discovered than those with stronger facts. 10 Many models assume perfect detection, meaning that hey assume all uncertain tax positions are detected and only those with strong facts are upheld by the taxpayer if the firm is audited,. This simplifying assumption does not generalize well to the reality of audits of large corporations with several uncertain tax positions. However, detection risk is likely to increase under certain audit both because the probability of the firm being audited increases to one and because the coordinated nature of these programs allows the tax authority to gain greater knowledge of the taxpayer's business, thus potentially enabling the tax authority to better identify uncertain tax positions. probability of audit when it chooses which amount to report; that is a taxpayer with high income who considers reporting low income not only considers the tax savings and potential penalties if caught, but also that reporting low income increases the probability of audit.
The most basic strategic tax compliance model predicts a negative association between audit risk and tax uncertainty, consistent with firms engaging in less tax uncertainty to reduce their probability of audit because uncertain tax positions increase the probability of audit (Graetz et al. 1986 ).
The strategic tax compliance model has been extended in many ways.
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Our paper is most closely related to models which focus on the probability of detection. For example, Sansing (1993) introduces certain and verifiable information, which allows the IRS to better focus audits on taxpayers with unverifiable information. Rhoades (1999) allows the audit decision to be made at the component level and determines that the IRS conditions its second audit decision on the results of the first component's audit. Mills and Sansing (2000) models that the difference between book and taxable income, both of which the IRS observes, can be informative to the IRS. Their empirical results show that though the magnitude of book-tax differences is positively associated with IRS proposed audit adjustments, book-tax differences are not associated with IRS settlements. This result suggests that corporate taxpayers require strong facts to enter into uncertain tax positions that will generate a book-tax difference because they appreciate that book-tax differences convey information to the tax authority.
However, for firms facing certain audit, engaging in less tax uncertainty does not reduce the probability that the firm is subject to audit. Though taxpayer behavior may reduce the probability that a particular line item or transaction is subject to audit, Rhoades (1999) suggests that the probability of a line item claimed by a certain audit firm being audited is greater than or equal to the probability of a line item claimed by a non-certain audit firm being audited. In other words, firms facing certain audit generally have less ability to influence the probability that a particular line item is audited than firms not facing certain audit.
The strategic tax compliance model discussed above provides some insight into taxpayer behavior in our setting. On the one hand, taxpayers could have less incentive to engage in uncertain tax avoidance if the increased audit probability decreases the expected benefit of tax uncertainty such that a subset of tax positions are no longer value-creating. On the other hand, Mills and Sansing (2000) suggests certain audit could increase the incentive to engage in uncertain tax avoidance. Specifically, because the IRS will audit the firm regardless of the signals provided in the financial statements, certain audit firms no longer have incentive to reduce the difference between book and taxable income.
This intuition is consistent with results presented in Slemrod et al. (2001) , which reports results of a 1995 experiment by the Minnesota Department of Revenue under which a random sample of individual taxpayers were told that the returns that they were about to file would be "closely examined." Relative to the sample not told this, the high-income members of the 'audit certain' sample significantly decreased their reported tax liability. The authors conjecture that these individual taxpayers claim more tax benefits to create a more aggressive starting point for negotiations with the goal of minimizing tax liability. Further, the authors postulate that this effect is observed in high-income taxpayers, but not low-or middle-income taxpayers, because high-income taxpayers believe that the final outcome of the certain audit is more manipulable due to their ability to hire professional assistance. This logic likely applies to the corporate taxpayers we study, as firms assigned to the CIC program tend to be large and/or have complex operations, both of which are likely correlated with the likelihood of professional tax assistance.
However, the corporate taxpayers in our sample have financial reporting obligations that individuals do not, which could cause these two types of taxpayers to have different tax avoidance preferences. In sum, how tax certainty affects taxpayer behavior is an empirical question.
Our paper is also related to three recent applied papers regarding the tax compliance game between the IRS and corporations. Hoopes et al. (2012) , DeBacker, Heim, Tran, and
Yuskavage (2013), and Lennox, Li, Pittman, and Wang (2015) suggest that increased enforcement leads to greater tax payments. Using data on IRS audit probability by firm size over time, Hoopes et al. (2012) provides evidence that firms with greater risk of IRS audit report higher cash effective tax rates relative to firms with lower risk of IRS audit. However, this result is not necessarily due to a change in tax avoidance behavior because the increase in cash tax rates could arise because of firms' decreasing tax avoidance to avoid audit selection or increased audit settlements as a result of higher tax enforcement. DeBacker et al. (2013) finds that tax payments are lower immediately following an audit, when the taxpayer is assumed to have lower expectations of another audit. As time passes and the probability of another audit increases, tax payments increase. Thus, similar to Hoopes et al.
(2012), Debacker et al. (2013) concludes that firms engage in less tax avoidance behavior when audit selection probability is higher. Finally, Lennox et al. (2015) examines the effect of tax audit examination on Chinese firms. Their results suggest firms report higher GAAP effective tax rates and lower book-tax differences after being audited. Our paper differs from these three studies because we test how taxpayers behave when facing audit certainty, an economically important setting between taxpayers and the tax authority that is fundamentally different from those previously examined.
Hypothesis Development
Although the aforementioned literature provides rich insight into taxpayer behavior, no studies have modeled or empirically examined the case where audit probability equals one.
While we can input parameters to force the probability of audit to one, prior theoretical models are designed for the tax authority to have an audit decision (to audit or not to audit). Thus, while our research question is informed by prior models, we develop our hypothesis primarily based on the following intuition.
A taxpayer's expected total tax payment equals the tax liability on their originally filed return plus the expectation of any future settlements: E[total tax payment] = tax liability as originally filed + prob(audit)*E(settlement)
[1]
Prior literature primarily considers situations where the probability of the firm being audited is a function of the tax liability as originally filed:
Prob(audit) = f (tax liability as originally filed, political environment, IRS budget, complexity and size of taxpayer, etc.) [2] In Equation [2] , when the probability of audit selection increases, the taxpayer can increase the tax liability on the originally-filed return (for example, by not entering into the most aggressive tax positions) to lower the probability of audit selection.
In our setting, however, the probability of firm audit selection is not a function of the tax liability as originally filed because Prob(audit) equals one upon assignment to the program.
Additionally, rational taxpayers should adjust E[total tax payment] upwards upon CIC program assignment as the continued existence of this program suggests that it generates additional revenue. If a taxpayer believes that an audit reveals complete truth (i.e., perfect detection risk), the taxpayer may choose to accept the expected higher tax payment (increase initial filing liability), which likely decreases the time associated with the audit and eliminates interest and penalties associated with expected disallowed tax positions. Alternatively, the taxpayer may not change tax avoidance behavior or even become more aggressive to begin negotiations from a more favorable starting point if the taxpayer does not believe in perfect detection risk or that a higher total tax payment is certain despite a certain audit.
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Thus, taxpayers may increase, decrease, or not change their avoidance behavior when the probability of firm audit increases to one.
Hypothesis: Audit certainty does not affect taxpayer behavior.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN Determinants of CIC Assignment
We first study the determinants of CIC Program assignment following the IRS's stated assignment criteria. The Internal Revenue Manual lists seven criteria "to be used in identifying those cases for the CIC Program." These criteria encompass various measures of size and complexity. Following IRM Exhibit 4.42.2-1, we specify the following logistic regression:
where CICFirm equals one if firm is assigned to CIC program and zero otherwise. The various
Size and Complexity measures are defined with a discrete point system similar to that specified in the Internal Revenue Manual.
Although the IRS uses tax return disclosures to assign points, we use only publiclyavailable data to estimate the determinants of CIC prediction in our model specifications so that 
Leverage (DLTT/AT) captures a conforming book-tax strategy; consistent with the tax exhaustion theory outlined in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) , firms with high levels of debt tax shields should engage in fewer additional tax avoidance strategies and thus should be of less interest to the IRS. R&D (XRD/SALE) may positively affect CIC assignment as the research and development (R&D) credit is an area of significant complexity, aggressiveness, and conflict, and the IRS notes that CIC assignment is based in part on complexity. However, following the tax exhaustion logic outlined for Leverage, R&D may negatively affect CIC assignment because firms with significant R&D credits should engage in fewer other tax avoidance strategies. CapInt captures whether the firm has a net operating loss (NOL) carryforward; firms with NOL carryforwards have lower incentives to engage in additional tax avoidance strategies.
Multivariate Regression Specification
We first estimate a pooled analysis to test whether firms assigned to the CIC program report greater tax liabilities and/or higher estimates of future taxes related to current uncertain tax positions.
We measure Tax 14 CICParticipationInd equals one for tax return-year observations where the firm is aware that it is assigned to the CIC program and zero otherwise.
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We interpret an insignificant coefficient on CICParticipationInd as consistent with the null hypothesis that audit certainty does not affect taxpayer behavior.
We next use changes analyses to examine whether tax behavior changes for firms that are assigned to the CIC program during our sample period 2000 to 2011 ('newly-assigned firms').
An important issue in examining whether behavior changes when a firm enter the CIC program is that we do not observe the counterfactual-what would have happened had the firm not been assigned to the CIC program. Specifically, the trends in tax behavior could be explained by the nature of the firms that are experiencing a program status change, by industry trends, or by mean reversion. To address the counterfactual issue, we construct two control samples.
The first matched sample for newly-assigned firms begins with all firms that are not assigned to the CIC program during our sample period 2000 to 2011 ('non-assigned firms').
Non-assigned firms are matched with firms in the year the firm is first assigned to the CIC program on both year and the propensity score generated in Equation [4] .
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The second matched sample for the newly-assigned firms begins with all firms that have been assigned to the CIC program for at least four years and remain assigned to the CIC program ('long-assigned firms'). As with non-assigned firms, long-assigned control firms are matched with newly-assigned treatment firms on year and propensity score. This matched sample design allows us to not only compare the tax behavior of the firm to itself before and after the change in its CIC program status, but to also compare its tax behavior with the tax behavior of a firm that does not experience a change in CIC status.
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Tax = β 0 + β 1 *POST + β 2 *∆Firm + β 3 * POST*∆Firm + Controls + ε We interpret an insignificant coefficient on β 3 as consistent with our hypothesis.
IV. SAMPLES AND RESULTS

CIC Prediction Model
The 18 We explore an alternative size requirement, $500 million in total assets, in Section V. 19 We acknowledge the possibility that non-CIC firms can be under audit without participating in the CIC program. However, unlike CIC firms that know they will be audited with certainty before filing their tax return, non-CIC firms are not informed of the audit until after filing their tax return.
CIC program. Many prior studies proxy for CIC program assignment with an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with at least $250 million in total assets, and zero otherwise. That only 19.5 percent of our firm-year observations with at least $250 million in total assets are assigned to the CIC program suggests that this commonly-used proxy is quite noisy in distinguishing large firms under certain audit.
Panels A and B show that firm-years assigned to the CIC program report greater assets and higher gross receipts than firm-years not assigned to the CIC program. Additionally, firmyears assigned to the program report more geographic and business segments, higher foreign sales, and higher foreign tax than firm-years not assigned to the CIC program. These differences are consistent with the CIC identification criteria outlined in the Internal Revenue Manual.
In addition, untabulated statistics suggest that CIC program assignment is quite sticky.
The median firm assigned to the program for at least one year is assigned to the program for 83 percent of the years it exists in the database of federal tax return data; at least 25 percent of sample firms are assigned to the program for all the years they exist in the database.
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More than 75 percent of sample firms are never assigned to the CIC program during our sample period.
[Insert Table 2 around here] In a previous version, we attempted to study firms that were released from the CIC program. We identified 289 firms that appeared to be released during our period. However, under deeper inquiry, we discovered that only 60 of those firms were truly released. The remaining 229 firms were temporarily released from the CIC audit for various reasons, such as reporting a loss. Because so few firms were truly released from the CIC program, we have removed this analysis from the paper.
A includes all firm-year observations outlined in Table 1 . In Panel A, CICFirm equals one for firm-years in which the firm is assigned to the CIC program and zero otherwise.
Panel B tests determinants of the initial CIC assignment decision using a sample of observations that were not assigned the CIC program in t-1. A firm assigned to the CIC program during our sample period is removed from the determinant sample beginning the year after its assignment. Thus, a firm never assigned to the CIC program remains in the sample for all years, while a firm assigned to the CIC program for every year between 2000 and 2011 is never included. In Panel B, CICFirm equals one for observations that have initially been assigned to the CIC program in t and zero otherwise.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Consistent with IRM Exhibit 4.42.2-1, both Size and Complexity factors contribute to CIC assignment. However, when CIC firm-years are excluded after the initial year of CIC assignment (Panel B), foreign complexity is no longer consistently directly related to CIC assignment but likely remains indirectly related to CIC assignment because of its effect on the number of geographic and/or business segments. Together, our results suggest that sales are the most significant Size determinant for CIC assignment and that the number of geographic segments is the most significant Complexity determinant for CIC assignment.
We estimate that a number of additional firm attributes are also associated with CIC assignment. Consistent with R&D expenses contributing to firm complexity (and controversy), we find that firms with higher R&D expenses are more likely to be assigned to the CIC program.
Consistent with tax exhaustion, we find that firms reporting excess tax benefits from stock options or an NOL carryforward are less likely to be assigned to the CIC program. Despite the numerous significant coefficients, however, the inclusion of these firm attributes does not change the area under the ROC curve in a meaningful way. Thus, while CIC assignment is associated with common factors related to firms' incentives or ability to avoid taxes, it appears that Size and Table 3 , these results continue to suggest that the Size and Complexity variables outlined by the IRS are the most significant determinants of CIC assignment.
Effect of Audit Certainty on Taxpayer Behavior
We use the CIC prediction model sample of 23,094 firm-year observations for our pooled levels analysis. For our changes analyses, we begin the construction of the non-assigned sample with the 405 firms first assigned to the IRS CIC program between 2000 and 2011. We calculate the CIC prediction score for these firms in the year of their CIC assignment. Using the sample of firms that are never in the CIC program between 2000 and 2011, we construct a sample of control firms that are matched on both year and CIC prediction score.
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For the 810 test and control firms, we obtain Compustat data from years t-2 to t+4, where year t represents the year the firm was assigned to the CIC program and post-assignment is considered to be years t+1 through t+4.
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This results in a final sample of 4,266 tax return-year observations. 21 We explore alternative matching specifications in Section V. 22 We require both the newly-assigned firm and the non-assigned match firm to have sufficient data in years t-1 to t+1 for the firms to remain in the sample. If either firm is not in the database in years t-2 or t+2 to t+4, we omit both Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the newly-assigned and nonassigned firms in year t, the year of the match. Even though firms are matched on year and then propensity score, firms still differ on some dimensions. Specifically, newly-assigned firms are larger in terms of both assets and gross receipts and have more foreign sales, foreign tax, leverage and R&D than their matched sample. Accordingly, we include these variables in our subsequent models to control for the effects that these differences may have on taxpayer behavior.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
As above, we begin the construction of the long-assigned sample with the 405 firms first assigned to the IRS CIC program between 2000 and 2011. Using the sample of firms that are in the CIC program for the four years prior to the ∆Firms' assignment to the program, we construct a sample of control firms that are matched on both year and CIC prediction score. Panel B of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the newly-assigned and long-assigned firms in the year of the match. For the 234 test and control firms, we obtain Compustat data from t-2 to t+4, which results in a sample of 1,344 tax return-year observations. Panel C of Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for each of our Tax measures in: (i) the pooled sample, (ii) the non-assigned sample, and (iii) the long-assigned sample.
Tables 5 through 8 present results of testing the null hypothesis that taxpayer behavior does not change when a firm's audit probability increases to one. In all four tables, Panel A presents the pooled test while Panels B and C present the changes analysis using the nonassigned and long-assigned matched samples, respectively. In Panels B and C, the first column presents results of estimating a simplified version of Equation [6] on only the newly-assigned firms in those years so that the match remains one-to-one based on firm-year. We follow the same methodology for the long-assigned matched sample.
firms ('∆Firms'); the second column mirrors the first for the matched control sample ('non∆Firms'); and the third column includes the full specification of Equation [6] with interactions to test the significance of any difference in tax behavior as well as controls for differences with the match itself.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
We proxy for Tax using the initial federal filing liability rate (Fed_Cash_ETR) in Table   5 . We proxy for Tax using Adj_Fed_Cash_ETR in Table 6 and Cash_ETR in Table 7 . We discuss the results presented in these two tables together because both measures are intended to capture total tax payments. In Panel A, we estimate no significant difference in Adj_Fed_Cash_ETR or Cash_ETR between firms assigned to the CIC program and firms not assigned to the CIC program. The changes analysis in Panels B and C also estimate that firms do not report a significant change in total federal cash payments or cash taxes paid, relative to income, once they are assigned to the CIC program. [Insert Tables 6 & 7 around here]
Finally, Table 8 In terms of economic magnitude, we estimate that firms experiencing a change in program status report $5.4 million ($7.9 million) more current year additions to the contingent tax reserve after joining the program relative to their matched non-assigned (long-assigned) firms in the same period. Untabulated analysis suggests that the increase in current year additions relative to the long-assigned firms is concentrated in the first two years after assignment is known, while the increase in current year additions relative to the non-assigned firms occurs over the full four-year time frame we study. It therefore appears that newly-assigned firms converge to reporting a similar current year addition to long-assigned firms but that the difference between newly-assigned and non-assigned firms persists.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Together, results presented in Tables 5 through 8 
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We outline a number of alternative specifications of the CIC prediction model and/or the ∆Firms/non-∆Firms match. Because Mills and Newberry (2001) suggest $500M in assets as an alternative size cutoff for the CIC program, we estimate Model [1] for all panels of Table 3 Table 3 . This heightened size requirement decreases our samples in Panels A and B by 22.95 percent and 27.88 percent, respectively. However, signs and statistical significance are virtually unchanged and the area of the ROC curve is also relatively stable in this alternative specification. Specifically, the area under the ROC curve for
Model [1] in Panels A and B is 91.82 percent and 81.85 percent, similar to the statistics presented in Table 3 . Thus, results appear robust to alternative sample specifications regarding firm size. Further, performing the non-assigned match based on this alternative sample does not significantly change results of our hypothesis tests.
In Table 4 , we create our matched samples using the propensity scores generated in Table 3 , which models the assignment decision and includes the year of assignment as well as additional years of program participation. In untabulated analysis, we obtain consistent results when we instead create our control samples using the propensity scores generated in Model [2] from Panels B of Table 3 , which models the initial assignment. We also match on the propensity score generated in Model [1] instead of Model [2] from Panel A and find both statistically and economically similar results. Thus, results appear robust to these alternative matching specifications.
Finally, as mentioned in Section IV,our inferences are unchanged when we include industry, year or industry-year fixed effects in our pooled regressions. We also redefine our three dependent variables to be scaled by Compustat Total Assets rather than Pre-tax Income and continue to find similar results in both the pooled and changes specifications.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study explores the effect of audit certainty on taxpayer behavior by examining taxpayers in the IRS Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) Program, a set of taxpayers that consume a substantial portion of IRS LB&I audit resources. Our results suggest firms report similar initial tax liabilities and total tax liabilities as a percentage of income after entering the CIC program relative to propensity-matched control firms. In terms of the strategic tax model, our results suggest that audit certainty does not have significant deterrence or enforcement effects.
However, we find that newly-assigned CIC taxpayers report higher additions to the contingent tax reserves relative to propensity-matched control firms, suggesting that audit certainty does impact financial reporting for income taxes.
Our study makes the following contributions. First, our model of the determinants of CIC assignment provides researchers a more accurate way to estimate whether a firm faces certain audit by the IRS. Prior studies generally choose an arbitrary size threshold for determining whether a firm faces certain audit (e.g., $250 million in assets). We report that less than 20 percent of the population of firm-years with at least $250 million in assets face certain audit, suggesting our model of CIC likelihood is a significantly more accurate way of operationalizing audit certainty. Second, our findings suggest that CIC assignment is mechanical in nature and that factors associated with a firms' incentives or ability to avoid taxes are not a significant determinant of this substantial resource allocation decision. Third, we further our understanding of the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority by examining the deterrence and enforcement effects of audit certainty. Finally, our study provides data useful to tax authorities in assessing the cost and benefits of the CIC program. Our results suggest that the CIC program does not have significantly higher deterrence and enforcement effects than the IRS's standard process of auditing large corporations not in the CIC program -an important finding as the IRS considers, designs and implements new audit approaches.
This research is subject to a number of caveats. First, although we attempt to address the counterfactual issue with a matched sample of control firms, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that firms experiencing a change in CIC program status might have reported a similar change in tax payments even absent a status change. Second, the U.S. allocates substantial resources to its tax authority. To the extent that other tax authorities allocate fewer or greater resources for tax enforcement, our results might not generalize to other certain audit programs. The highlighted portion (______) is the typical time period that a firm would be notified regarding CIC assignment for year 0. Thus, both the 10-K and the 1120 for year 0 were filed when the firm was not aware of its CIC assignment but both the 10-K and the 1120 for year t+1 are filed under audit certainty.  The propensity score match is done using year 0 10-K data.  POST = 1 for years t+1 and forward, years under which the 10-K and 1120 are filed knowing that the firm will be subject to CIC audit.  Though years 0 and forward will certainly be subject to CIC audit, any previous open years could also be subject to CIC audit.
APPENDIX B Summary of IRM Exhibit 4.46.2-2
The Internal Revenue manual outlines criteria for identification of CIC program assignment in Exhibit 4.46.2-2. The assignment is based on seven criteria: 1) Total Assets, 2) Gross Receipts, 3) Operating Entities, 4) Multiple Industry Status, 5) Total Foreign Assets, 6) Total Related Transactions and 7) Foreign Tax. We model our variables and point assignment scheme off this document.
Aside from book-tax consolidation differences, we are able to use Compustat data and closely follow the variable definition and point assignment system for criteria 1) Total Assets, 2) Gross Receipts and 7) Foreign Tax.
1. Total Assets (Compustat AT, IRS 4.46.2-2 point system) •1 point up to $500 Million in assets;
•2 points for assets in the $500 Million to $1 Billion asset range; •3 points for assets in the $1 Billion to $2 Billion asset range; •4 points for assets in the $2 Billion to $5 Billion asset range;
•5 points for assets in the $5 Billion to $8 Billion asset range; •Add 1 point for each additional $3 billion in assets or fraction thereof, not to exceed 12 points. This table presents results comparing newly-assigned CIC firms to non-assigned firms and long-assigned firms. Panel A presents univariate differences between newly-assigned CIC firms and non-assigned firms in the year of CIC assignment (year t). Panel B presents univariate differences between newly-assigned CIC firms and long-assigned firms in the year of CIC assignment (year t). Panel C presents descriptive statistics for Fed_Cash_ETR, Adj_Fed_Cash_ETR, Cash_ETR, and UTB_CY_ADD. See Appendix C for variable definitions. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
